Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Posture by Erik Gartzke, Matthew Kroenig, and Neil Narang


8159b8c73c56f0e.jpg Author Erik Gartzke, Matthew Kroenig, and Neil Narang
Isbn 9781138925694
File size 3.97MB
Year 2016
Pages 370
Language English
File format PDF
Category politics and sociology


 

Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Posture This volume examines the causes and consequences of nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies. The real-world importance of nuclear weapons has led to the production of a voluminous scholarly literature on the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation. Missing from this literature, however, is a more nuanced analysis that moves beyond a binary treatment of nuclear weapons possession, to an exploration of how different nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies may influence the proliferation of nuclear weapons and subsequent security outcomes. This volume addresses this deficit by focusing on the causes and consequences of nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies. It is the aim of this book to advance the development of a new empirical research agenda that brings systematic research methods to bear on new dimensions of the nuclear weapons phenomenon. Prior to the contributions in this volume, there has been little evidence to suggest that nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of nuclear weapons or security outcomes. This book brings together a new generation of scholars, advancing innovative theoretical positions, and performing quantitative tests using original data on nuclear postures, nonproliferation policies, and WMD proliferation. Together, the chapters in this volume make novel theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions to the field of nuclear weapons proliferation. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international relations, and security studies. Neil Narang is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, USA. Erik Gartzke is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, USA. Matthew Kroenig is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, USA. Routledge Global Security Studies Series Editors: Aaron Karp and Regina Karp Global Security Studies emphasizes broad forces reshaping global security and the dilemmas facing decision-makers the world over. The series stresses issues relevant in many countries and regions, accessible to broad professional and academic audiences as well as to students, and enduring through explicit theoretical foundations. 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Kuperman Ballistic Missile Defence and US National Security Policy Normalisation and acceptance after the Cold War Andrew Futter Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy Sanctions, incentives, and target state calculations Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman Technology Transfers and Non-Proliferation Between control and cooperation Edited by Oliver Meier Northern Security and Global Politics Nordic-Baltic strategic influence in a post-unipolar world Edited by Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic Regional developments in a global world Edited by Rolf Tamnes and Kristine Offerdal Precision Strike Warfare and International Intervention Strategic, ethico-legal, and decisional implications Edited by Mike Aaronson, Wali Aslam, Tom Dyson, and Regina Rauxloh Nuclear Proliferation and the Psychology of Political Leadership Beliefs, motivations, and perceptions K.P. O’Reilly Nuclear Weapons and International Security Collected essays Ramesh Thakur International Relations Theory and European Security We thought we knew Edited by Lorenzo Cladi and Andrea Locatelli The Evolution of Military Power in the West and Asia Security policy in the post-Cold War era Edited by Pauline Eadie and Wyn Rees Regional Peacemaking and Conflict Management A comparative approach Edited by Carmela Lutmar and Benjamin Miller Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Posture Causes and consequences for the spread of nuclear weapons Edited by Neil Narang, Erik Gartzke, and Matthew Kroenig Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Posture Causes and consequences for the spread of nuclear weapons Edited by Neil Narang, Erik Gartzke, and Matthew Kroenig First published 2016 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 selection and editorial material, Neil Narang, Erik Gartzke, Matthew Kroenig; individual chapters, the contributors The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nonproliferation policy and nuclear posture : causes and consequences for the spread of nuclear weapons / edited by Neil Narang, Erik Gartzke, and Matthew Kroenig. pages cm. -- (Routledge global security studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Nuclear nonproliferation. 2. Nuclear arms control. I. Narang, Neil, editor. II. Gartzke, Erik, editor. III. Kroenig, Matthew, editor. JZ5675.N664 2016 327.1’747--dc23 2015017282 ISBN: 978–1–138–92569–4 (hbk) ISBN: 978–1–315–68363–8 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by GreenGate Publishing, Tonbridge, Kent Dedicated to the new generation of nuclear security scholars, producing novel insights in a more complex era. This page intentionally left blank Contents List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Acknowledgements 1 Introduction: Nuclear posture, nonproliferation policy, and the spread of nuclear weapons xi xii xiv xvi 1 ERIK GARTZKE, MATTHEW KROENIG, AND NEIL NARANG PART I Nonproliferation policies and the spread of nuclear weapons 2 Force or friendship? Explaining great power nonproliferation policy 13 15 MATTHEW KROENIG 3 Nuclear strategy, nonproliferation, and the causes of foreign nuclear deployments 43 MATTHEW FUHRMANN AND TODD S. SECHSER 4 Security guarantees and allied nuclear proliferation 69 PHILIPP C. BLEEK AND ERIC B. LORBER 5 Security commitments and nuclear proliferation 94 DAN REITER 6 Talking peace, making weapons: IAEA technical cooperation and nuclear proliferation ROBERT BROWN AND JEFFREY M. KAPLOW 120 x Contents 7 Making it personal: Regime type and nuclear proliferation 149 CHRISTOPHER WAY AND JESSICA WEEKS PART II Nuclear postures and the spread of nuclear weapons 8 The determinants of nuclear force structure 173 175 ERIK GARTZKE, JEFFREY M. KAPLOW AND RUPAL MEHTA 9 Poor man’s atomic bomb? Exploring the relationship between “weapons of mass destruction” 205 MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ AND NEIL NARANG PART III Nuclear postures and the consequences of nuclear weapons 10 What does it take to deter? Regional power nuclear postures and international conflict 233 235 VIPIN NARANG 11 Conventional wisdom? The effect of nuclear proliferation on armed conflict 268 DAVID SOBEK, DENNIS M. FOSTER, AND SAMUEL B. ROBISON 12 Questioning the effect of nuclear weapons on conflict 295 MARK S. BELL AND NICHOLAS L. MILLER PART IV Conclusion 13 Conclusion: Contributions, future directions and policy implications 313 315 JACOB ARONSON AND PAUL HUTH Index 344 Figures 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 8.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1 11.1 11.2 11.3 Average number of projects among TC participant states TC projects by category and weapons program status Receipt of IAEA vs. bilateral nuclear assistance (through 2000) Personalist regimes and the pursuit of nuclear weapons Unique nuclear platforms over time Survival curve for nuclear weapons pursuit Survival curve for chemical weapons pursuit Survival curve for biological weapons pursuit First differences for each level of the dependent variable against both non-nuclear and nuclear opponents The effect of a nuclear weapons program on being targeted in a deadly territorial MID The effect of proliferation and initiator’s advantage on  the initiation of a deadly territorial MID Preferences, nuclear weapons program, and the initiation  of deadly territorial MIDs 127 128 130 160 185 222 224 226 255 282 285 287 Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 Power projection capability and the effects of nuclear proliferation Great power NPT signature dates Measuring force and friendship, 1968 Great power provision of sensitive nuclear assistance The foreign deployment of nuclear weapons, 1945–2000 Logit analysis of foreign nuclear deployments Substantive effects of statistically significant covariates Logit analysis of foreign nuclear deployments: Sensitivity analysis Quantitative studies of proliferation and security guarantees Core multivariate hazard modeling results Fully specified multivariate hazard modeling results US foreign deployments of nuclear weapons, US defense pacts, 1945–2000 US nuclear weapons deployment and nuclear weapons acquisitions, 1945–2000 Defense pacts with the US and nuclear weapons acquisitions, 1945–2000 Cox event history analysis of causes of nuclear weapons acquisition, 1945–2000 Additional Cox event history analysis of causes of nuclear weapons pursuit and acquisition, 1945–2000 Top participants in fuel cycle-related TC, 1972–2010 Analysis of nuclear weapons programs, 1972–2000  Analysis of nuclear weapons program initiation and continuation, 1972–2000 Personalist regimes and the pursuit of nuclear weapons (dependent variable: Singh and Way codings) Personalist regimes and the pursuit of nuclear weapons (dependent variable: Jo and Gartzke codings) Personalist regimes and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Event history models Nuclear force structure hypotheses Descriptive statistics 19 22 24 28 54 57 59 61 70 78 79 101 102 102 104 106 129 135 139 162 164 165 186 190 Tables 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2 9.3 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 13.1 13.2 Analysis of number of unique nuclear platforms Substantive effects of statistically significant variables Pursuit and possession of biological weapons, 1945–2000 Pursuit and possession of chemical weapons, 1945–2000 Impact of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pursuit on risk of pursuing other WMD types, controlling for proliferation ‘willingness’ Characteristics and coding rules for regional power nuclear postures Description of dependent variable from Bennett and Stam (2004) and empirical rates of occurrence for all politicallyrelevant dyads between 1816–2001 Frequency count in full sample of dependent variable for each nuclear posture-type target state through 2001 Relative risk-ratio for outbreak of conflict at each level given a particular nuclear posture within politically relevant dyads between 1816–1992 Relative risk-ratio for outbreak of conflict at each level given a particular nuclear posture within politically-relevant dyads between 1816–2001 The effect of a nuclear weapons program on being targeted in a dispute, 1945–2001 The effect of a nuclear weapons program on being targeted in a dispute, 1945–2001 The effect of a nuclear weapons program on being targeted in a dispute while controlling for the initiator’s advantage, 1945–2001 The effect of a nuclear weapons program on being targeted in a dispute while controlling for preferences, 1945–2001 The ratio of the probability of war in a non-nuclear dyad to that in a nuclear dyad The ratio of the probability of each level of conflict in a non-nuclear dyad to that in a nuclear dyad The ratio of the probability of each level of conflict in a non-nuclear dyad to that in an asymmetric nuclear dyad The ratio of the probability of MID initiation in a non-nuclear dyad compared to asymmetric and symmetric nuclear dyads The ratio of the probability of MID initiation in a non-nuclear dyad to an asymmetric nuclear dyad Heckman analysis of security guarantees and proliferation Logit analysis of regime type and proliferation xiii 192 196 213 214 219 244 249 250 252 253 279 281 284 286 302 303 305 305 306 320 324 Contributors Jacob Aronson is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government and Political Science at the University of Maryland. Mark S. Bell is a PhD candidate in Political Science at MIT, and a research fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. Philipp C. Bleek is Assistant Professor in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, CA.  Robert Brown is Assistant Professor at Temple University and Senior Fellow at the University of California Institution on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Dennis M. Foster is Professor of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute.  Matthew Fuhrmann is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University. Erik Gartzke is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, where he has been a member of the research faculty since 2007. Michael C. Horowitz is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Paul Huth is a Professor in the Department of Government and Political Science at the University of Maryland and the Editor of the Journal of Conflict Resolution. Jeffrey M. Kaplow is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at the College of William & Mary. Matthew Kroenig is Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Contributors xv Eric B. Lorber is an associate in the International Trade and Compliance practice group at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP. Rupal Mehta is a Fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard University and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln. Nicholas L. Miller is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Neil Narang is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Vipin Narang is the Mitsui Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT. Dan Reiter is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Chair of Political Science at Emory University. Samuel B. Robison is a researcher, grant writer, program evaluator, and evaluation consultant at Louisiana State University. Todd S. Sechser is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia. David Sobek is Associate Professor of Political Science at Louisiana State University. Christopher Way is Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University and Director of the Cornell Institute of European Studies. Jessica Weeks is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Trice Faculty Fellow at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. Acknowledgements The editors thank the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California, Georgetown University, the University of California – Santa Barbara, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University for generous research and financial support. 1 Introduction Nuclear posture, nonproliferation policy, and the spread of nuclear weapons Erik Gartzke, Matthew Kroenig, and Neil Narang What is the relationship between nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies, and the spread of nuclear weapons? At first blush, this might appear to be an obvious question. After all, states go to great lengths to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—extending nuclear security guarantees to nonnuclear weapon states; forward-deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of allies; sizing their own nuclear arsenals with the proliferation decisions of other states in mind; supporting international institutions in conducting inspections of nuclear facilities in nonnuclear weapon states; restricting the availability of sensitive nuclear technology; applying and enforcing sanctions against would-be proliferators; conducting military strikes against nuclear facilities; and promoting nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes—among many other steps. It would be strange to imagine that states pursue such actions unless they can expect a policy payoff in terms of peace or security. Yet, there is little systematic evidence to suggest that nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of nuclear weapons. Correctly understanding the effects of nuclear posture and policy on both horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to new states) and vertical proliferation (increases in the size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals within existing nuclear states) is a subject of extreme real-world importance. United Nations Secretary, General Ban Ki-moon (2008), has identified weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as “one of the gravest challenges facing international peace and security.” Similarly, in his 2013 annual worldwide threat assessment to the U.S. Congress, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper (2013), observed that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. To respond to this threat, government officials devise policies to prevent the diffusion of the world’s most dangerous weapons. Yet, policymakers have little to guide them in these potentially momentous decisions, other than precedent, anecdote, and intuition. As an influential group of nuclear policy experts recently noted, “there is no agreed-upon, direct way to assess the impacts of changes in the U.S. nuclear posture upon the effectiveness of deterrence or assurance” (Murdoch et al. 2009). Indeed, several senior U.S. government officials have complained to the co-editors of this volume that the academic community has failed policy 2 Erik Gartzke et al. makers by not conducting the basic research that would inform policy decisions about the costs and benefits of various nuclear policies and postures. This is not to say that the subject of nuclear proliferation has been overlooked by scholars. Far from it. The causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation have been the subject of a voluminous academic literature. For decades, scholars have carefully examined why countries pursue nuclear weapons (e.g., Sagan 1996/1997) and the effect of nuclear weapons on international conflict (e.g., Schelling 1960). More recently scholars have examined variation in state nuclear nonproliferation policies (e.g., Kroenig 2014). Yet, with few exceptions (e.g., Kroenig 2009a; Fuhrmann 2009b; Solingen 2012), scholars have not examined how the policies adopted by states or international institutions spur or retard the spread of nuclear weapons. The chapters in this book begin to correct this deficit by focusing on the causes and consequences of nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies. By systematically examining how different nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies may influence the proliferation of nuclear weapons and subsequent security outcomes, we aim to advance the development of a new empirical research agenda that brings systematic research methods to bear on new dimensions of the nuclear weapons phenomenon. We argue that nuclear postures and policies can exert an important independent effect on horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation as well as strategic security outcomes between states, but that these relationships often also work in unexpected ways. Many of the relationships uncovered in this volume buttress conventional wisdom in policy circles about the determinants of nuclear proliferation. For example, Philipp Bleek and Eric Lorber (Chapter 4) find support for the idea that nuclear security guarantees reduce the incentives for the recipients of such guarantees to develop independent nuclear capabilities (Knopf 2012). Other findings, however, run strongly counter to intuition. Robert Brown and Jeffrey Kaplow (Chapter  6), for example, demonstrate how a core activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the implementation of Technical Cooperation (TC) programs, actually increases the probability of nuclear weapons proliferation. For most of the chapters in this edited volume, the key dependent variable will be the same: horizontal nuclear proliferation. These chapters use the standard set of measures developed in previous research (Singh and Way 2004, Jo and Gartzke 2007) to examine whether nuclear postures and policy choices of nuclear weapons states (Kroenig, Chapter  2) can influence the ability for nonnuclear states to explore, pursue, or acquire nuclear weapons (Brown/Kaplow, Chapter  6; Bleek/Lorber, Chapter  4; Fuhrmann/Sechser, Chapter 3; Reiter, Chapter 5; Way/Weeks, Chapter 7). These chapters also collect new nuclear data that are treated as independent variables, including nuclear security guarantees and IAEA TC programs. Other chapters focus on various determinants of vertical nuclear proliferation, by developing new measures to gauge increases in the size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals in existing nuclear weapon states (Gartzke/Kaplow/Mehta, Chapter 8; Horowitz/ Introduction 3 Narang, Chapter  9). In particular, they collect and analyze new data on delivery vehicles; chemical and biological weapon exploration, pursuit, and possession; and the forward-deployment of nuclear weapons. Finally, several chapters examine or re-examine the consequences of nuclear weapons possession (Miller/Bell, Chapter  12; Vipin Narang, Chapter  10; Sobek/Foster/ Robison, Chapter  11), by paying specific attention to the mediating effect of nuclear postures. For these chapters, the dependent variables are security outcomes like crises or war. The volume can be divided into three substantive parts. Part  I seeks to understand the relationship between nonproliferation policy and horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation. Kroenig (Chapter 2) begins this exploration by first pointing out that there is significant variation in nonproliferation policies across states. This variation leads to several important research questions. Why do great powers take such different approaches to the issue of nuclear proliferation? Why do states oppose nuclear proliferation more vigorously in some cases than in others? In short, what explains great power nonproliferation policy? To answers these questions, this chapter tests two competing theories of nonproliferation policy. The first, political relationship theory, suggests that states oppose nuclear proliferation to their enemies but are less concerned when friends acquire nuclear weapons. The second, powerprojection theory, argues that states oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to states over which they have the ability to project military power, because nuclear proliferation in those situations would constrain their military freedom of action. In contrast, states will be less likely to resist, and more likely to promote, nuclear proliferation to states against which they cannot use force. To test these hypotheses, this chapter uses evidence from great power nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 2000. While both theories find some support, the power-projection theory performs significantly better. The findings of this chapter have important implications for international relations theory and US nonproliferation policy. Beginning from the previous observation that nonproliferation policies vary significantly across states, Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd Sechser (Chapter  3) attempt to explain variation in one particular policy, widely thought to be an explicit tool of nonproliferation policy: the forward-deployment of nuclear weapons. They ask why countries deploy nuclear weapons abroad. Since 1945, more than twenty states have hosted foreign nuclear weapons on their territory, and five countries continue to do so today. These deployments have important consequences for international security, yet there is little systematic research about the factors that drive them. The authors develop three broad theoretical frameworks to explain why foreign nuclear deployments occur. Using a new data set of foreign nuclear deployments between 1945 and 2000, they find that two factors weigh heavily in driving these deployments: the protection of allies, and the projection of military power. Interestingly, while it is often argued that forward deployments contribute to nuclear nonproliferation by increasing the credibility of

Author Erik Gartzke, Matthew Kroenig, and Neil Narang Isbn 9781138925694 File size 3.97MB Year 2016 Pages 370 Language English File format PDF Category Politics and Sociology Book Description: FacebookTwitterGoogle+TumblrDiggMySpaceShare This volume examines the causes and consequences of nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies. The real-world importance of nuclear weapons has led to the production of a voluminous scholarly literature on the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation. Missing from this literature, however, is a more nuanced analysis that moves beyond a binary treatment of nuclear weapons possession, to an exploration of how different nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies may influence the proliferation of nuclear weapons and subsequent security outcomes. This volume addresses this deficit by focusing on the causes and consequences of nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies. It is the aim of this book to advance the development of a new empirical research agenda that brings systematic research methods to bear on new dimensions of the nuclear weapons phenomenon. Prior to the contributions in this volume, there has been little evidence to suggest that nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of nuclear weapons or security outcomes. This book brings together a new generation of scholars, advancing innovative theoretical positions, and performing quantitative tests using original data on nuclear postures, nonproliferation policies, and WMD proliferation. Together, the chapters in this volume make novel theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions to the field of nuclear weapons proliferation. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international relations and security studies.     Download (3.97MB) Terrorism and WMDs: Awareness and Response, Second Edition Eliminating Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Prospects For Effective International Verification State Behavior And The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime Representation In Congress: A Unified Theory The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism Load more posts

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